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M.: Corporations--Promoters--Individual Liability on Contracts in Beh
RECENT CASES

tionable, must affect injuriously the corporation, as distinct from
the individuals who compose it. Brayton v. Cleveland Special
Police Co., 63 Oh. St. 85, 57 N. E. 1085. But it may sue if the
libel or slander of the individuals who compose it causes the corporation to sugtain special damages. Trenton Mut. Life etc. Ins.
Co. v. Perrine, 23 N. J. L. 412. A corporation cannot sue in respect of a charge of murder, or incest, or adultery, or corruption,
or assault because it cannot commit these crimes. The words complained of must attack the corporation in the method of conducting its affairs, or in its financial position, or must accuse it of
fraud or mismanagement. South Hetton Coal Co. v. Northeastern
News Ass'n, [1894] 1 Q. B. 133; Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87; Hahnemannian Life Ins. Co.
v. Beebe, 48 Ill. 87. The fact that the libel or slander was uttered
or published by a member of the corporation will not defeat recovery. Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Go. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N.
87. The rule as to recovery is the same when the libel or slander
is directed against the corporate business. St. James Military
Academy v. Gaiser, supra. A person guilty of libelling or slandering a private corporation may be held liable criminally.
Boogher v. Life Ass'n of America, 75 Mo. 319; People v. Carroll,
t8 N. Y. App. Div. 201, 62 N. Y. Supp, 790. There is only one
modern case which holds that a corporation cannot sue for slander. Church of St. Louis v. Blanc, 8 Rob. 51 (La. 1844).
-W. E. G.
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TRACTS IN BEHALF OF CORPORATION.-The complainants owned a
lease on two lots and a building thereon. They agreed to sell the
same to a corporation later to be formed by the two defendants.
Notes purporting to be the notes of the corporation, signed by the
defendants as president and secretary, respectively, were given to
the complainants in consideration of the sale; and a deed of trust,
signed in like manner, was given to secure the same. The corporation was formed and had the benefit of the contract. Upon default
in the payment of the notes it was sought to hold the defendants
liable personally. Held, that the promoters were not liable. Carle
et al. v. Corhan et al., 103 S. E. 699 (Va. 1920).
The early English authority wag that only the promoters were
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liable on a contract purporting to be for a future corporation, on
the ground that there was no existing principal and that when the
corporation later came into being it could not logically ratify a
contract which it could not itself have made. Kelner v. Baxter,
L. R. 2 C. P. 174. This was followed in Massachusetts. Abbott
v. Hapgood, 150 Mass. 248, 22 N. E. 90G. Later cases in England
spell out a liability on the part of the corporation, but require a
showing of an express new contract of identical terms. See H. S.
Richards, "The Liability of Corporations on Contracts Made by
Promoters", 19 HARV. L. REv. 97, 102. American courts, where
there are acts by the corporation appropriating the benefits of the
contract, make it liable by what is termed an "adoption" of the
contract. Munson v. Syracuse R. Co., 103 N. Y. 58, 8 N. E.
355; McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319, 51 N. W. 216.
The true basis for the holding is not, it is submitted, an anomalous "adoption" of the contract, but an implied in fact novation.
The principal case is, in outcome, in accord with this American
rule. But the opinion goes farther knd says, by way of dictum,
that once the corporation has become liable the third party has
then generally the "double security" of the corporation and of the
promoters. The only authority cited is a previous dictum of the
same court. Strause v. Richmond Woodworking Co., 109 Va. 724,
65 S. E. 659. Cf. Fentress v. Steele, 110 Va. 578, 583, 66 S. E.
870, 872. The meaning intended by the language used is not
clear. It can hardly be meant that there can ever be a double recovery on such contracts. If it be meant that the promoters and
the corporation may be held jointly liable or that one or the other
may be held at the option of the third party it is submitted that
this is inconsistent with the only theory upon which the corporation
can be held, i. e., upon an implied in fact novation. -S. C. M.
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West Virginia: statute
(ACTS 1917, c. 12 § 2) provided that every able bodied male resident of the state between the ages of sixteen and sixty years, except
bona fide students during school term, who should fail or refuse
to engage regularly and steadily for at least thirty-six hours a
week in some lawful and recognized business, profession, occupation or employment, should be held to be a vagrant and be guilty
of a mis9demeanor, regardless of the financial ability of such perACTS: BASIS

OF
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